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THE CASE OF THE LIQUIDATION DECISION
IN BANKRUPTCY
Douglas G. Baird* and Edward R. Morrison†
I. INTRODUCTION
Patience is, perhaps, the first virtue of the decisionmaker. Be-
fore we make a decision, we have to know when to make it. Too
soon, and we may not have enough information. Too late, and op-
portunities may be lost forever. We must have information before we
can make a sound decision, but gathering information takes time. As
George Stigler pointed out many years ago, every decisionmaker
must be able to recognize the point at which information-gathering
should stop and a course be chosen.1 In f w places is the problem
more acute than in law. The challenge of knowing when to make a
decision permeates our legal system. The judge must decide when in
the course of litigation to entertain summary judgment motions; the
administrator must decide when to issue regulations; the lawyer must
decide when to settle; the plaintiff must decide when to bring suit.
Legal institutions should be designed to ensure that those who
make such decisions make them at the right time. This paper ex-
plores how we can usefully study the legal system from this vantage
point. A few scholars have shown how the timing of decisions af-
                                                  
* The University of Chicago.
† The University of Chicago. We are grateful to Ian Ayres, Michael Johan-
nes, Eric Posner, José Scheinkman, George Triantis, and Ivan Werning for
their help and to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the John M.
Olin Foundation for research support.
1 George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213
(1961). One can understand this paper as an effort to apply Stigler’s idea of
search to the task of judging. Instead of the consumer engaged in search for
information before deciding what to buy, it is the judge who must search
before deciding the matter before her.
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fects such things as incentives to bring suit and the structure of civil
procedure,2 incentives to breach under different contract damages
regimes,3 and the timing of environmental regulation.4 The impor-
tance of the timing of decisions is, however, largely unappreciated in
law, particularly in bankruptcy, where timing issues so often are
front stage and center. By way of illustration, we focus on one of the
central questions in bankruptcy cases—the question of when to shut
a firm down. We waste resources if we are merely postponing the
inevitable, but when we liquidate a firm, firm-specific assets, in-
cluding human capital, are lost forever.
                                                  
2 Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19
J. Leg. Stud. 173 (1990). See also Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory
for Risk Multipliers of Attorney’s Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation,
73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1943 (1998) (using a real options approach to assess the
effect of damage multipliers on the incentive of parties to settle).
3 Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in Contract
Breach Decisions, 41 J.L. & Econ. 163 (1998) (showing that that an ex-
pectations damages regime creates a real option to breach that the parties
will tend to exercise earlier than is socially optimal).
4 AVINASH DIXIT & ROBERT PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY  405-18 (Princeton 1994) (using real options theory to explore the
optimal timing of environmental regulations to control pollutants and the
incentives of firms to comply with the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990).
In a related literature, a number of legal scholars have used the theory of
financial options (which are similar to, but quite different from, real op-
tions) to explain features of the legal system or to propose reforms. For a
taste of this literature, see Lucian Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988) (using options theory to
propose a new method for sorting out the rights of creditors in corporate
reorganizations), and Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options
Pricing, 24 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1995) (using options theory to explain why
courts rationally favor money damages over specific performance). This
literature, however, does not focus squarely on the optimal time to exercise
options. It is this timing issue that is central to the emerging literature using
real options theory.
3 OPTIMAL TIMING OF THE LIQUIDATION DECISION
The timing of a decision is, of course, driven by the difficulty of
gathering information, and problems associated with information are
nothing new to legal analysis generally nor to bankruptcy scholar-
ship more specifically. Indeed, much of bankruptcy scholarship in
recent years has focused on private information—information avail-
able to one or more of the parties, but not to the court.5 But the tim-
ing question is a distinct one. Indeed, in this paper, we ensure our
focus remains squarely on the timing question by making many sim-
plifying assumptions. First, we assume there is no private informa-
tion. Information takes time to gather, but it is equally available to
everyone. Second, we assume that the decisionmaker is an unbiased
and complete master of all available information. In short, we focus
only on the timing of the decision.
We find there is much to say about the structure of bankruptcy
law after posing the liquidation question in the simplest possible
terms. For this reason, we are confident that this way of looking at
legal decisionmaking can be profitably and broadly applied across
many frontiers.
II. THE RECAPITALIZATION PROBLEM
A firm is in financial distress when its future earnings are insuf-
ficient to pay its creditors what it owes. The law of corporate reor-
ganizations exists to allow firms in financial distress to create a new
capital structure in which fixed obligations are more aligned with the
firm’s future income.
Some firms that file for Chapter 11 suffer only from financial
distress (what practitioners call a “balance sheet problem”), not from
economic distress. For example, a firm goes through a leveraged
buyout that leaves it too thinly capitalized to withstand a downturn
in the economy. There may be nothing wrong with the way the
                                                  
5 See Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient
Firms?, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1319 (1994).
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firm’s assets are deployed. It simply has a capital structure that is
inconsistent with the firm’s present and future cash flows.
Other firms (indeed perhaps the majority of those that file for
Chapter 11) suffer economic distress and have no prospects as going
concerns. The firm might be an unsuccessful retailer whose supplier
as already repossessed its entire inventory. Chapter 11 may be an
effective vehicle for sorting out the rights to what few assets the firm
has.6
The remaining firms in Chapter 11 are those of interest to us.
These firms are in financial distress, but we cannot yet tell whether
or perhaps the extent to which they are in economic distress as well.
The firm was successful in the past, but then encountered hard times.
Perhaps the firm can no longer compete effectively and should be
shut down. But it is also possible that it made a misstep that is not
likely to be repeated. In highly competitive markets, the occasional
bad year is inevitable. Shutting down the firm destroys both a brand
name and firm-specific capital, including marketing infrastructure
and the job-specific human capital of employees.
The law of corporate reorganizations can create a new capital
structure in two different ways. First, it can provide a mechanism by
which the firm is sold to a third party. As in the case of firms that
has never been in financial distress, the new owner is free to create
whatever capital structure she pleases. There is no reason to believe
a regulator would do better than a sole owner in making capital
structure decisions. Meanwhile, the proceeds of the sale are divided
                                                  
6 See Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong
About its Critics, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 829 (1994). Shortly after the 1978
Bankruptcy Act was put into effect, there were many firms that had few
prospects of surviving as a going concern, but that turned to Chapter 11 for
one last chance. Rarely could one justify these cases in economic terms.
There are fewer of these cases now, however. Moreover, bankruptcy
judges, particularly after United Savings Association v. Timbers, 484 U.S.
365 (1988), are likely to dismiss such firms from bankruptcy at the start of
the case.
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among the investors according to the priori ies they enjoy either by
contract or by statute.
Instead of an actual sale to a third party, the law of corporate re-
organizations can provide a process by which there is a hypothetical
sale. A new corporate entity with a new capital structure is created
and, instead of receiving proceeds from an actual sale, old investors
receive interests in the new firm that respect their priority rights.
Chapter 11 as it is now practiced is a hybrid of the two systems. The
bankruptcy judge oversees the deliberative hypothetical sale process,
but may, on the proper occasion, order a sale to a third party.
Comparisons between Chapter 11 and other reorganization re-
gimes suggest that hypothetical sales are likely to take longer than
sales to a third party.7 Even the process of selling a firm to a third
party, however, takes time—several months on average and perhaps
as much as a year. Hence, a study of the liquidation decision is im-
portant for any bankruptcy regime, not just those like Chapter 11
where the idea of a hypothetical (as opposed to actual) sale of assets
                                                  
7 There are very few empirical studies that compare bankruptcy auctions to
Chapter 11 proceedings. An exception is Karin S. Thorburn, Bankruptcy
Auctions: Costs, debt recovery, and firm survival (Aug. 1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript, Amos Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College).
Thorburn focuses on bankruptcy filings in Sweden, where the bankruptcy
law provides that all bankrupt firms are immediately sold through public
auctions. Using a sample of bankruptcy filings during the period 1988-
1991, Thorburn finds that the average time from filing to the date firm as-
sets are sold is about 2.4 months. However, the large standard deviation –
3.4 months – suggests that auctions of some firms take significantly longer.
In contrast, Thorburn cites an unpublished study finding that Chapter 11
reorganizations can take over two years. See E. Flynn, Statistical analysis
of Chapter 11 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, Admin. Office of U.S.
Courts) (cited in Thorburn, supra) (using a sample of small firm cases and
finding that average time in bankruptcy is about 25 months).
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ensures that making liquidation decisions well is of central impor-
tance.8
Ensuring that liquidation decisions are well-made in this envi-
ronment is hard. The players in the bankruptcy practice all seem to
have bias, lack expertise, or both. Assume that the firm can be shut
down and its assets sold for $100, including $50 in cash. The firm
can stay in business, but it will have to spend the $50 to buy new
inventory. If the business turns around, it will be worth more than
$150. If it fails, it will be worth $50 in a year’s time. The creditors
are owed $100.
Liquidating the firm would be a bad idea if the firm had an 80%
chance of success; it would be a good idea if it had only a 20%
chance of success.9 The creditors as a group, however, will prefer
                                                  
8 Defenders of the current regime sometimes are simply hostile to the idea
that markets can work effectively when firms are in distress, but some
scholars who ordinarily embraces market mechanisms defend Chapter 11
as well, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient? 27
J. Fin. Econ. 411 (1990). Recent evidence suggests that the costs of Chap-
ter 11 may not be large, publicly traded firms. See Gregor Andrade & Ste-
ven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evi-
dence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 J.
Fin. 1443 (1998); Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, Asset Effi-
ciency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms, 53 J. Fin. 1495
(1998). It should be noted, however, that these firms are the ones least
likely to liquidate. See Kai Li, An Empirical Examination of U.S. Firms in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (UBC Working Paper 1998; available at
http://finance.commerce.ubc.ca/re-search/abstracts/).
9 We are following the convention in the law and economics literature and
assuming that the goal of bankruptcy is to maximize the value of the firm’s
assets. Some bankruptcy scholars take a different view. See Karen Gross,
FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
(Yale 1997). The basic points we make about the liquidation decision,
however, do not turn on this assumption. Virtually everyone understands
that, at some point, the prospects of surviving as a going concern do not
justify continuing. We show that understanding whether that point has
7 OPTIMAL TIMING OF THE LIQUIDATION DECISION
liquidation, regardless of the firm’s chances. They will be paid in
full if the firm liquidates. They can do no better if the firm succeeds
as a going concern and they can do worse. (They never receive more
than $100 even if the firm flourishes and, if things go badly, they
receive only $50.)
By contrast, the shareholders receive nothing if the firm is liq-
uidated today, but they receive $50 if the firm stays in business and
things turn out well. Hence, they will favor reorganization, even if
the firm had only a 20% chance of success. The managers of the
debtor may also be shareholders. Even if they are not, they may fa-
vor reorganization because the reorganization always them to keep
their jobs, at least for a while longer.
The problem is far from trivial, even if one had in place an un-
biased party who was adept at making such decisions. In this paper,
we model rigorously the decisionmaking process that such a person
must go through. The model helps us in at least two ways. First, it
gives us additional i sight into the costs we face by having a longer
reorganization and hence the benefits of a regime, such as the actual
sale, that cut it short. Second, it allows us to understand the way in
which we can shape our legal rules to minimize the costs that arise
from entrusting the liquidation decision to someone other than a sole
owner.
The model we use assumes that no private information exists,
that whoever is entrusted with the liquidation decision is as well in-
formed as anyone. Because this assumption is contrary to most other
models of corporate reorganizations, we set out in the next part of
the paper why this assumption is justified, at least in the context of
an initial effort to understand the liquidation decision.
                                                                                                                    
been crossed, regardless of where it is set, turns crucially on the informa-
tion one has and the additional information one expects to acquire.
CHICAGO  WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 8
III. THE LIMITED ROLE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
IN BANKRUPTCY
To make sensible decisions about whether to keep a firm intact,
the decisionmaker must know both about its financial condition and
the underlying business. It is not enough to know what revenues the
firm produces, one also wants to know whether the firm is profitable.
Similarly, it is not enough to know what products the firm is pro-
ducing today, one also wants to know about its future products and
whether they can be built on schedule. It is, of course, costly for the
decisionmaker to gather this information. The largest cost may sim-
ply be time, but we also have to ask whether those who possess the
relevant information have the power to keep it from the decision-
maker.
One might think that the owner-managers have much better in-
sight into the prospects of the business but be unable to convey this
information credibly. Information about profits and new product de-
velopment and the firm’s ability to meet changes in the industry
seem hard to convey. The owner-managers will present any infor-
mation they have in a way that reflects their own biases and there
may be no easy way to correct for them. If there is no way to check
whether their claim that the firm’s prospects are bright, the court will
have no way of knowing whether the firm will in fact do well or
whether the owner-managers are merely playing for time.10
There are reasons to believe, however, that such problems do
not loom large in reorganizations. If we believed that private infor-
mation were an important determinant of the costs of d cisionmak-
ing by firms, investors should favor organizational forms that reduce
these costs. Yet, if one looks broadly at different ownership struc-
tures, one sees little evidence that private information drives organ-
izational form.11 Managerial opportunism is not a large problem,
                                                  
10 See, e.g., White, supra note 5.
11 The most comprehensive account is Henry Hansmann, THE OWNERSHIP
OF ENTERPRISE (Harvard 1996). Hansmann shows that, in industry after
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given our existing legal regime.12 In monitoring the managers, the
greatest dangers seem to be excessive slack and retention of earn-
ings. But these dangers are small when a firm experiences financial
distress.
Firms in Chapter 11 are those whose managers have every in-
centive to work as hard as they can. A healthy firm might be hard to
value because there may be earning potential that is untapped and
profits that are squirreled away, but the onset of financial distress
itself disciplines the managers. Indeed, the justifications for lever-
aged buyouts often center around the discipline that they bring to
managers.13
The dangers of private information are most important in firms
in which a single owner-manager controls the operation, such as
high technology start-up firms. These firms, however, rarely enter
bankruptcy. Financed with venture capital, they typically have a fi-
nancial structure with little debt. The investors have made equity in-
vestments and the only creditors are unpaid wages and accounts pay-
able. These debts are small relative to the value of the firm’s assets.
Hence, these firms can be doing extremely poorly and still no bank-
                                                                                                                    
industry, private information seems to have only a small role in determin-
ing the capital structure of firms.
12 The problems can be considerable, however, in other legal regimes, such
as those in Russia. See Andre Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Cor-
porate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 773 (1997).
13 See Douglas G. Baird, Leveraged Buyouts, 2 NEW PALGRAVE DIC-
TIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 192 (1998).
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ruptcy petition will be in the offing.14 The decision to liquidate such
ventures therefore is controlled by contract, not by bankruptcy law.15
These contracts themselves suggest that private information
may not loom large when a firm is in financial distress. They suggest
that venture capitalists believe they can enforce contracts that are
contingent on many different subsequent measures of financial and
nonfinancial performance and output. We commonly see clauses that
turn on financial measures often thought hard to observe (such as the
firm’s net worth and profitability), as well as nonfinancial charac-
teristics of a firm’s operations (such as whether there are material
deviations from the business plan or product improvements that in-
corporate new functional ty).16
In short, there is enough reason to doubt the importance of pri-
vate information in bankruptcy decisionmaking to begin the task of
modeling the timing of decisions using a simple model in which in-
formation takes time to gather, but is equally available to everyone.17
It is such a model to which we turn in the next Part.
                                                  
14 Bankruptcy law is primarily concerned with sorting out the rights of
multiple creditors. While there is no requirement of insolvency (of liabili-
ties in excess of assets) for voluntary bankruptcy petitions, a court will
likely dismiss a filing unless there is “a financially beleaguered debtor with
real debt and real creditors.” See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr.
727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
15 They provide that in bad states of the world the venture capitalist ac-
quires control of the corporation and the power to shut the firm down. St-
ven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts(April
1999) (unpublished manuscript, The University of Chicago).
16 See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 15.
17 We do not claim that bankruptcy judges stand in the same position as
venture capitalists. We argue to the contrary in Section VII. In that section,
however, we show that judges may possess sufficiently powerful informa-
tion gathering tools that they can gain access to much of the information
available to venture capitalists.
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IV. THE LIQUIDATION DECISION AS
THE EXERCISE OF A REAL OPTION
In a coherent reorganization regime, there must be a mechanism
that tries to ensure that the firm will be liquidated at the time when it
is in everyone’s interest. To keep things simple, we start by assum-
ing that the mechanism is one that entrusts this task with a single un-
biased individual for whom relevant information is as accessible as it
is to anyone else.
The decisionmaker must, at every moment in time, ask whether
it is in everyone’s interest to liquidate the firm. The challenge she
faces is known in the finance literature as an optimal stopping prob-
lem, and economists have, in recent years, developed a powerful set
of tools to analyze such problems.18
We begin with a stylized model (Appendix 1 contains a general
model).19 At t = 1, the firm receives earnings of p1.20 At the same
time, the firm starts the process of forming a new capital structure.
(For our purposes, it does not matter whether the process involves an
actual or hypothetical sale, only that whatever process is chosen
takes at least until t = 3.) The liquidation value of the firm’s assets at
t = 1 is L. If we wait until  = 2 to liquidate the firm, we shall still
receive L in nominal dollars,21 but time is money. We are always
better off receiving a certain sum today rather than at some time in
                                                  
18 See DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4.
19 This model draws on the framework in DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4,
at 26-46.
20 These earnings are net of any expenses incurred during the period and
exclude any payments to creditors.
21 We are assuming that when the firm liquidates and its assets are sold off,
all firm-specific value is lost. The assets are fungible goods sold for the
competitive price. Hence, there is no real option connected with the timing
of their sale. In our model, we assume that the nominal amount that can be
realized from the sale remains constant over time. Creditors lose only from
the time value of money associated with the delay.
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the future. We shall assume a discount rate of 10% for each period.22
If the decisionmaker decides not to liquidate the firm and it remains
as a going concern, the firm receives earnings at t = 2 that are either
high (ph) with probability p or low (pl) with probability 1-p.
At t = 2, the decisionmaker can again decide to liquidate the
firm for L. If she does not liquidate the firm at that time, it remains
as a going concern forever. After t = 2, the earnings of the firm are
constant. If firm earnings are high (ph) at t = 2, they will be high (ph)
in all later periods; if earnings are low (pl), they will be low in all
future periods. Thus, when the firm first files for Chapter 11 protec-
tion, the decisionmaker faces the distribution of firm earnings d-
picted in Figure 1.
Figure 1
p
1-p
hp
1p
lp
hp
lp
t=1 t=2 t=3 . . .
. . .
. . .
                                                  
22 In other words, we are indifferent between receiving $100 at t = 1 and
$110 at t = 2: the pres nt value of $110 at t = 2 is $100 at t = 1.
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We shall assume that the liquidation value of firm assets (L) is
$100, firm earnings are ph = 1.5p1 and pl = .5p1, and that the prob-
ability of ph at t = 2 is p = .5. At  = 2, all uncertainty disappears. If
the firm receives high earnings at t = 2, it will receive high earnings
at t = 3 and at all subsequent times. If we discount this income
stream, its present value at t = 2 is (not including the earnings re-
ceived at t = 2) 10ph = 10 x 1.5p1 = 15p1. By contrast, if the firm
generates low earnings at t = 2, the discounted value of its earnings
for the rest of its life, measured at t =2 (and again not including
earnings received at t = 2), is 10pl = 10 x 0.5p1 = 5p1.
First, let us examine the decisionmaking process at t = 2. As-
suming the firm was not liquidated at t = 1, the decisionmaker can
either liquidate at t = 2 and realize $100 or it can keep the firm intact
as a going concern forever. If the decisionmaker takes the latter
course when earnings are low (pl), the firm will generate a stream of
earnings starting at t = 3 and continuing forever. We know this
stream is worth 5p1. If this sum is less than $100 (that is, if p1 < 20),
the decisionmaker will always liquidate at t = 2 when earnings are
low. If the firm’s earnings turn out to be high (ph) at t = 2, we can do
a similar calculation and discover that the decisionmaker will liqui-
date if p1 < 6.67, but not otherwis .
The problem the d cisionmaker faces at t = 1 is harder. Let us
assume that p1 = 8 and we want to calculate the expected value of
the firm if it remains a going concern indefinitely. The firm will r-
ceive earnings of ph = $12 or  pl = $4 at t = 2 with equal probability.
Hence, from the vantage point of the judge at t = 1, the firm has an
expected return at t = 2 of $8. We similarly have an expected return
of $8 at  = 3 and each subsequent period. (Since earnings at t = 1
are the best forecast of earnings at t = 2, t = 3, and all future periods,
we are implicitly assuming that the growth rate of earnings is zero.)
This expected earnings stream discounted to its present value at t = 1
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is $80.23 This amount is less than what the firm is worth if liquidated
at t = 1 ($100). Thus, it might seem that the decisionmaker should
liquidate the firm. But this would be the wrong conclusion. We must
also take into account the value of waiting for a period to find out
whether the firm’s future earnings in all future periods will be high
or low.
Let us assume that the decisionmaker does not liquidate the firm
at t = 1. What is the expected value of the firm to the creditors,
bearing in mind that the decisionmaker has the power to liquidate at t
= 2? It is possible that earnings will be high and the firm will receive
$12 at  = 2 and in all subsequent periods. As we showed above, this
income stream has a present value of $120 at t =  and a decision-
maker will liquidate only if p1<6.67. Since p1 = 8 here, we know that
a decisionmaker will not liquidate if earnings are high at t = 2.
Hence, in the good state, $132 will be available to the creditors at t =
2. (The creditors enjoy the $12 the firm receives at t = 2 and the in-
come stream worth $120 it will start to receive at t = 3.)
However, it is equally likely that the firm’s earnings at t = 2
will be low. The decisionmaker then must decide whether to liqui-
date the firm. In the bad state, this decision is easy. We know a deci-
sionmaker will liquidate if p1<20, which is clearly the case here.
Since p1 = 8, the firm would only produce an earnings stream of
only $40 if kept intact, much less than $100, the amount that can be
realized by liquidation at t = 2. Hence, in the bad state of the world,
                                                  
23 We know that the value of the income stream at t = 2 (including the
earnings received at t = 2) is 0.5 (11ph + 11pl). We also know that 11ph =
16.5p1 and that 11pl = 5.5p1. Hence, the expected value of the firm at t = 2
is 11p1. Because we are looking at this income stream att = 1, however,
we must discount it. (The firm receives p1 at t = 1 even if it liquidates at t
= 1. Therefore, we have to compare the amount we realize on liquidation
($100) with an income stream that starts only at t = 2.) At t = 1, the value
of an income stream of 11p1 starting att = 2 is worth 10p1 when the dis-
count rate is 10%.
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$104 is available at t = 2 ($4 in earnings received at t = 2 and $100
received from selling the assets).
Thus, assuming the decisionmaker does not liquidate the firm at
t = 1, the expected value of the firm at this date must reflect the
equal possibilities of the good state (worth $132) or the bad state
(worth $104) in the next period. The expected value of the firm at t
= 2 is $118. Using a 10% discount rate, this amount is worth $107 at
t = 1.
We want to compare the amount we can realize at t = 1 by liq-
uidating (or $100) with the expected present value of the firm if we
delay liquidation decision until after we learn whether its earnings
will be high or low (or $107). When p1 = 8, the decisionmaker
should wait until t = 2 and should not liquidate at t = 1. Even though
at t = 1 the liquidation value of the firm is $100 and its expected
value as a going concern is only $80, it should still be kept intact. If
we focus only on the value of the firm if it remains as a going con-
cern, we fail to take into account the benefits of waiting until we
gather more information. In this case, the benefits of waiting are
large enough to justify continuing the firm, even though its expected
value as a going concern alone is not.
Of particular interest to us are those cases in which the present
value of the firm as a going concern is less than its liquidation value.
In these cases, the value of the ability to postpone the liquidation d-
cision until t = 2 instead of having to make a once-and-for-all deci-
sion at  = 1 is given by
[ ] 100)1005(.)155.1(
1.1
1
5. 111 -+++÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ ppp (1)
which is the difference between the expected value of the firm (dis-
counted) if the liquidation decision is made at t = 2 and the liquida-
tion value of the firm at t = 1. Simplifying, the value of this liquida-
tion option becomes:
7.73p1 – 54.5 (2)
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This example illustrates a more general point. In deciding
whether to liquidate a firm, the decisionmaker must take into ac-
count the costs and benefits of waiting until more is known about the
value of the firm. Even when the expected earnings of the firm when
discounted to present value is less than the liquidation value (as was
the case when p1 was $8), the d cisionmaker may still want to keep
the firm intact, at least for a short period. In other words, we can
think of the ability to postpone the liquidation decision as an option.
To assess the merits of liquidating a firm today or keeping it intact as
a going concern, the decisionmaker must estimate not only the ex-
pected value of the earnings of the firm if it remains intact, but also
the value of the liquidation option.24
                                                  
24 Many scholars have noted that traditional net present value (NPV) analy-
sis (or “discounted cash flow” analysis) is an inappropriate measure of
projects where the decisionmaker possesses real options. See, e.g., DIXIT &
PINDYCK, supra note 4, ch. 1. Traditional NPV analysis evaluates a project
(e.g., whether to liquidate a firm, whether to build a factory) by comparing
the discounted value of the project’s expected future payoffs to the costs
necessary to implement the project. If payoffs exceed costs (NPV is posi-
tive), the project is worthwhile.
NPV analysis, as traditionally applied, is an appropriate valuation tech-
nique under conditions where the decisionmaker must make a now or
never investment decision (i.e., there is no ability to delay he decision)
and cannot do anything to affect the value of the project in subsequent pe-
riods, or where the investment decision can be delayed but the decision-
maker can undo any decision and recoup any expenditures. These condi-
tions may characterize some investments, such as bonds and stocks, but
they do not hold true in many projects, such as the decision to build a fac-
tory or to shut down a firm. In these projects, real options exist. Most ob-
viously, the decisionmaker can delay the decision whether to invest in a
project. During the delay, the decisionmaker may receive new information
that affects the value of the firm. Thus, the ability to delay is valuable. It
represents a real option because the decisionmaker possesses the equiva-
lent of a call option: the decisionmaker has the right, but not the obligation,
to invest in a project now or in the future. If new information reveals that
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The information the decisionmaker needs to value the liquida-
tion option is different from the information she needs to value the
expected earnings of the firm as a going concern (i.e., the “net pres-
ent value” of the firm). We can show this by considering a variation
on our model. To estimate the value of a firm as a going concern, the
decisionmaker need know only the value of p1, not the value of ei-
ther ph or pl. In expectation, the firm will earn p1 in every period.
Indeed, we can increase the spread between ph and pl without af-
fecting the value of the firm as a going concern. Such a change,
however, has an effect on the value of the option.
Previously we let ph = 1.5p1 and pl = .5p1. Suppose now that ph
= 1.75p1 and pl = .25p1. As before, we shall assume that the deci-
sionmaker will always liquidate the firm at t = 2 if earnings are pl.
Modifying equation (1), we see that the value of the liquidation op-
tion here is:
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Simplifying, this becomes:
                                                                                                                    
the project is more valuable than previously expected, the d isionmaker
will exercise this option and invest. If the new information shows that the
project is actually a dud, the option will go unexercised.
Investment projects may feature other types of real options. For example, a
project with negative NPV may be worthwhile because it creates the op-
portunity to make “follow-on” investments in the future. The ability to
make follow-on investments is a valuable real option. After the initial proj-
ect is completed, the decisionmaker will have additional information about
these investments. Only if the information reveals that these investments
are worthwhile will the option be exercised. See Richard A. Brealey and
Stewart C. Myers, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE ch. 21 (1991), for
a simple numerical example of this type of real option.
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8.86p1 – 54.5 (4)
Comparing (2) and (4), we see that the value of the option changes in
the face of uncertainty about future earnings of the firm, even though
in expectation the present value of the earnings of the firm, if it re-
mains as a going concern, does not. The value of the liquidation op-
tion rises as the uncertainty about future earnings increases, imply-
ing that the decisionmaker should be more patient—more willing to
defer the liquidation option to the next period—when there is large
uncertainty over firm earnings than when future earnings are more
predictable.
To make the liquidation decision, therefore, the decisionmaker
must estimate both the firm’s earnings in every period in the future
and the uncertainty associated with these earnings. She first estab-
lishes the value of p1 and builds her estimate on that. She uses the
information given her to estimate the way this value is likely to
change and the degree of uncertainty associated with her estimate.
This method of valuing a firm is well understood in the finance lit-
erature. We can capture how the earnings change at any moment in
time in the following way:
tttt dWdtd spmpp += (5)
Equation (5) models the process by which the earnings of the firm
change (dpt) at each moment in time.25 W  can then use this process
                                                  
25 This representation of the process is known as geometric Brownian mo-
tion with drift, where changes in the level of earnings are lognorm lly dis-
tributed. We can understand this process and the way it tracks the value of
a troubled firm’s earnings by imagining a random walk with drift. Consider
the following story. We are on a large open field and we are standing on a
long straight line. We blindfold a person and ask that person to walk along
that line. We want to predict how much that person changes the distance
between her and the straight line at each mom nt in time.
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to determine the value of the liquidation option. The process has two
components. The first tells us how we expect earnings to change
over time. In our model, we assumed that earnings remained con-
stant after t = 2. If the firm is recovering from economic distress,
however, we would expect the earnings to improve over time. The
predicted rate of growth of earnings is m. The higher m, the more
valuable the firm as a going concern and the more valuable the liqui-
dation option.
Also crucial is the second component, s, which measures the
volatility (or variance) of future earnings. During any period, the
condition of the firm may turn out to be better or worse than we ex-
pect. Not only does the condition of the firm affect earnings for that
period, but for future periods as well. Just as we based our predic-
tions of earnings at t = 2 on earnings at t = 1, we also based our pre-
dictions of earnings at t = 3 on earnings at t = 2. If earnings were
                                                                                                                    
The answer depends upon two things. First, we need to know how much
the person is likely to deviate from a straight line unconsciously. (People
do this because they favor one leg over another.) This effect is analogous
to the first term, the rate of drift m. It tells us the path we expect this person
to follow. Second, we need to know how likely each step is to depart from
this predicted path. A clumsy person paying less attention might make big-
ger departures from this path at every step than someone who was careful
and whose steps were more measured. We can have two people with the
same predicted path, but one may be more likely to stray from it in one
direction or another. This effect is captured in the second term: the amount
of variance, the random error the person makes with each footstep, is given
by s.
To return to bankruptcy decisionmaking, the straight line is our benchmark
p1, the earnings that the firm now enjoys. Our prediction that earnings will
increase over time at a given rate is m. It is analogous to predicting how
much our person will tend to drift to the right. (In the simple model here
we have assumed that m = 0.) The amount that earnings will depart from
our expectations is and it is analogous to the amount the person is likely
to stray from our predicted path at each point.
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high at  = 2, we expect them to be high at t = 3; if earnings were low
at t = 2, we expect the same at t = 3. Thus, to estimate future earn-
ings, we need to know how much better or worse earnings might de-
part from what we predict. In our example, it is knowing whether
future earnings are likely to be 1.5p1 or p1, rather than 1.75p1 or
.25p1.
We can measure the variance in earnings over time using the
term s. Although s has no independent effect on the expected value
of the future stream of earnings of the firm as a going concern, it
does affect the value of being able to postpone the liquidation dec-
sion. As the volatility of firm earnings increases, the potential gain
from waiting increases.
The volatility of future earnings does not affect the liquidation
value. We can still liquidate the firm for the same amount L at any
point in time. The increase in downside exposure from higher vola-
tility is merely the lower earnings we receive before we liquidate,
not the amount realized in the event of liquidation. These low earn-
ings in bad states do indeed become even lower as the variance in-
creases. But the possibility of very low earnings for one period (im-
mediately after which the decisionmaker will then liquidate the firm
for L) is more than offset by the possibility of high earnings in all
future periods when things turn out better than we expected.
In our example, the increased downside was the risk of receiv-
ing a return of .25p1 rather than .5p1 for a single period, but the up-
side gain was the possibility of receiving 1.75p1 rather than 1.5p1 in
each period indefinitely. As we can see from comparing (2) and (4),
the possible gain over all future periods when variance increases is
greater than the loss in a single period. This result holds in the gen-
eral case as well.26
V. EXERCISING THE LIQUIDATION OPTION
The decisionmaker needs to know how much can be realized by
selling the assets; she also needs to know the current income the firm
                                                  
26 See Appendix 1.
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is generating. But option pricing forces us to focus on two additional
elements: (1) the average growth (m) of this earnings stream over
time; and (2) the variance of earnings (s) within any period of time.
These characteristics of firm earnings pin down the value of the de-
cisionmaker’s option to liquidate.
Both characteristics of the firm—m and s—will depend on i-
dustry- and firm-specific factors. In some industries, firms are likely
to generate a more or less constant and predictable flow of revenue
over time. We open a pizza parlor. Income during the first few
months may be somewhat variable as we iron out the kinks in man-
agement and customers learn about our service. But after those first
few “start up” months, our firm will generate a steady stream of in-
come over time. It will rise more or less in sync with inflation and
there will be relatively little variance, and much of that will be con-
nected with overall conditions of the economy. Thus the expected
growth rate of firm earnings m is low and the variance of earnings
each period s is close to zero.
Armed with this information alone, a decisionmaker might well
be able to make the liquidation decision once she had only modest
and readily accessible knowledge about the firm. The pizza parlor
occupies a highly desirable storefront. It has been in business for
several years, it is not meeting its ongoing operating expenses, and
nothing in the environment is about to change. Because it is unlikely
that firm revenues (and profit) will increase in the future, we are may
be better off if the decisionmaker liquidates firm assets sooner rather
than later.
In other words, when profitability of firms in a particular indus-
try grows slowly and is fairly predictable (m nds are relatively
low), the value of the liquidation option is small. The decisionmaker
does not raise the value of the firm by deferring the liquidation dec-
sion to a future date. The relevant information is at hand and the pos-
sibility that earnings will unexpectedly rise in the future is low.
Hence, we are better off if the decisionmaker exercises the liquida-
tion option sooner rather than later.
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The hard cases arise when the volatility of firm profit (s) is
high. Volatility may exist at the outset because of conditions that are
firm specific. The firm needs to make significant changes in its op-
erations, perhaps because of mismanagement in the past. Similarly,
mismanagement may make it hard for anyone to have a grasp on the
firm’s prospects. During the first few months of the postpetition pe-
riod, earnings will be highly uncertain, but the volatility may decline
over time. Long-term volatility, the climate in which the liquidation
decision matters the most, can arise when there is wide-variation
among similar firms in the same industry. From the perspective of
the decisionmaker, the variance of earnings s is quite high in these
firms, even though the expected growth rate m may b high or low.
When the variance of firm profit (s) is high, the decisionmaker
is most likely to increase the welfare of all parties by deferring the
liquidation decision to some future date and waiting for more infor-
mation about firm profitability in the interim. Greater uncertainty (s)
increases the value of the liquidation option. The potential upside
increases (the possibility that firm profit will increase in the future)
while the potential downside is limited by the liquidation value of
firm assets. If the firm is at least generating a positive cash flow and
the liquidation value of the assets is stable, delaying the liquidation
decision merely postpones the time at which we realize L, the liqui-
dation value of the firm. This cost is worth bearing when there is a
possibility that the future income in every period may turn out to be
large.27
                                                  
27 Although we characterize s as a measure of the volatility, uncertainty, or
“riskiness” of firm profits, we use these terms informally. Technically, s is
only a measure of the standard deviation of profits, i.e., the spread of out-
comes around the expected (average) profit level. Thus, s should not be
confused with the standard measure of “riskiness”, beta (b), which meas-
ures the sensitivity of an asset to market movements. If an inve tor holds
the market portfolio (e.g., the Standard and Poor’s Composite Index) and is
considering purchasing a share of firm profits, beta would measure the
contribution of that share to the riskin ss of the investor’s portfolio, i.e.,
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When a firm first enters the recapitalization process—the proc-
ess of the actual or hypothetical sale that leads to a better capital
structure—the decisionmaker has very little information about the
firm and its prospects. The decisionmaker will not know the extent
of the firm’s assets. Also unclear may be the ability of the firm to
generate earnings in the future. There may be uncertainty about the
demand for the firm’s products. Costs may be uncertain as well. The
firm may need to restructure its management or operations in order
to reduce costs. Only time will tell whether these efforts are success-
ful. Finally, uncertainty may arise from the state of the industry.
Troubled firms are often in a troubled industry, and the future pros-
pects of the firm may depend heavily on the prospects of the industry
as a whole.
These forms of uncertainty will affect the expected earnings pt.
Notice that each form of uncertainty will also affect the variance of
future profitability s. As the court receives more information about
firm assets or the ability of the firm to cut costs, it will gain a clearer
picture of the firm’s future prospects. Thus, we expect this compo-
nent of variance to decline over time. However, we do not expect
total variance s to fall so far that the variance of profits becomes
trivial. Uncertainty about the industry and about demand for firm
product—as well as uncertainty arising from factors not considered
here—will remain relatively constant over time. Thus we expect to
fall, but at a decreasing rate. In other words, there are diminishing
returns to gathering information over time.
                                                                                                                    
the extent to which that share of firm profits increases the variance of the
investor’s portfolio. In contrast, s merely measures the extent to which
firm profits will deviate from the expected (average) level of profits. While
an increase in s will increase the variance of profits, it may reduce the
variance of the investor’s portfolio (if firm profits are negatively correlated
with the market rate of return). For more discussion of the relationship
between s and beta, see Br aley and Myers, supra note 24, ch. 7 (1991).
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Thus, the value of the liquidation option will decrease with
time. Recall that the value of the liquidation option increases with
the variance of profit: the higher the variance, the higher the prob-
ability that profits will increase tomorrow. The variance of profit is
decreasing; hence the value of the liquidation option is decreasing.
This implies that the earnings p* one needs to justify delaying the
liquidation decision ncreases over time. In other words, a ecision-
maker should be less patient, more willing to make a once-and-for-
all liquidation decision, as she learns more about the prospects of the
firm (and therefore the variance of future earnings s declines).
These features of our model have testable implications. The
probability that a decisionmaker will liquidate firm assets should be
low when the firm enters the recapitalization process and then rise
dramatically as more information becomes available and the vari-
ance of earnings s falls. However, the probability of liquidation
should eventually decline. If the decisionmaker chooses not to liqui-
date a firm’s assets within the first few months of the recapitalization
process, she is unlikely to do so ever. Since the firm has survived the
decisionmaker’s scrutiny during the early months when she is gath-
ering information, it must be a firm with strong propects.
This is a form of “selection” effect: only the firms with strong
prospects will survive the early period of judicial scrutiny. These are
the firms that should remain as going concerns, so the probability of
liquidation will be quite low. In short, the probability of liquidation
during the postpetition period should be “hump” shaped. It should be
low initially when little information is available, then rise substan-
tially as the decisionmaker identifies the firms with no future, and
then fall since the only remaining firms have strong prospects.28
                                                  
28 These implications of our model are identical to those arising from mod-
els of job search, where a real options model is frequently used to study the
decisions of workers to enter and exit firms. A seminal paper in this area is
Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. Pol.
Econ. 972 (1979). Scholars have confirmed the empirical predictions of
these job search models and found that the probability (or “hazard rate”)
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IV. THE LIQUIDATION DECISION AND
FIRM-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT
Thus far we have made several simplifying assumptions that
permit us to focus squarely on the liquidation option in bankruptcy
decision making. We have assumed, for example, that the bank-
ruptcy judge has only two choices in each period: either liquidate the
firm or allow it to continue operating. In reality, the judge will face a
more complex set of choices: if she does not liquidate the firm today,
she can still choose among several alternative reorganization plans
that offer different combinations of expected earnings growth m and
volatility s. A richer set of choices, however, would not change our
analysis in the previous section. In each period, the judge would rank
the various reorganization plans using a somewhat complex algo-
rithm that depends critically on the plan’s combination of m and s.29
Once the best plan is identified, that plan becomes the alternative to
liquidation and the judge applies the same decisionmaking process
that we identified in Section IV.
Perhaps more controversially, we have assumed that the liqui-
dation value of the assets L remains constant.30 There are many good
reasons why the liquidation value L may rise or fall if the bankruptcy
judge permits a troubled firm to continue operating. Frequently some
of the existing assets will be used as the firm operates. If the firm
                                                                                                                    
that workers will exit a firm is “hump shaped” with respect to worker ten-
ure. See, e.g., Julia Lane & Michael Parkin, Turnover in an Accounting
Firm, 16 J. Labor Econ. 702 (1998).
29 This algorithm is known as a dynamic allocation index (DAI) and is
central to the “multi-armed-bandit” literature. For a discussion of this lit-
erature and the assumptions underlying a DAI, see Robert A. Miller, Job
Matching and Occupational Choice, 92 J. Pol. Econ. 1086 (1984). A semi-
nal paper in this literature is Martin L. Weitzman, Optimal Search for the
Best Alternative, 47 Econometrica 641 (1979).
30 There is no inflation in our model, so L measures the value of firm assets
in real terms.
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performs poorly, these assets will be lost and L will fall; if the firm
performs well, however, these assets may be recouped and L will be
unchanged (or may even rise). For example, hard assets like money
can be spent on research and development. If the firm subsequently
fails, the dollars spent on R&D are lost and the value realized in
nominal dollars from the asset sale is lower than if liquidation had
take place earlier. But if the firm is successful in subsequent periods,
the R&D expenses may enhance the value of firm assets: product
innovation not only attracts new customers but also increases the
value of the firm’s brand name, its good will, and other assets.
Again, however, the qualitative results of our simple model in Sec-
tion IV do not change when we allow L to rise or fall over time.
There are many ways to explain why we might see variation in
the liquidation value L. We might assume, for example, that the liq-
uidation value in any period is correlated with earnings in that pe-
riod. If earnings fall, L also falls. We believe, however, that the most
natural way to think about changes in the liquidation value of firm
assets is to assume that L v ries as a result of investment decisions.
When a firm needs a new capital structure, it may need new capital
investments as well. Some of these may be investments in human
capital. (For example, we must pay a bonus to bring on a new chief
executive officer.) We may also need to replace some of the key
equipment. Or we need to acquire new inventory. We incorporate
this possibility into the model in this part. The most important cases
are those where the expected earnings of the firm as a going concern
(discounted to present value) are less than the liquidation value when
the bankruptcy starts at t = 1. Hence, we focus on these.
We can return to our model and assume that, if the firm is not
liquidated for L = $100 at t = 1, we shall need to spend $20—half on
new equipment and half on new inventory. If the firm liquidates at t
= 2 or in any later period, L in nominal dollars will only be $90 be-
cause only half of what we spend on pump-priming can be recovered
in a liquidation. We can recapture a large part of the value of the
new equipment, but only a small part of the value of the new inven-
tory. To highlight the effect of reductions in L  the liquidation op-
tion, we will assume first that the $20 expenditure has no effect on
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the growth (m) or volatility (s) of earnings. Therefore, the decision-
maker should wait before liquidating the firm only if
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Simplifying, this becomes:
009.5973.7 1 >-p (7)
The left-hand side of (7) is simply the value of the liquidation op-
tion, so waiting makes sense only when this option has positive
value. Comparing (7) with the value of the liquidation option in our
original model (2), we see that when money must be spent at the
start of the case in order to keep the firm intact, the value of this op-
tion goes down. If the earnings received at t = 1 are still $8, the deci-
sionmaker should still keep the firm intact. The liquidation option
has positive value so long as p1>7.64. But the d cisionmaker can
reach this conclusion only if she understands how money spent at the
start of the case affects both the liquidation value and the liquidation
option.
A closer look at our model helps illuminate the question of
pump priming. We can separate the money being spent each period
by the firm and separate it into two categories. First are the expenses
of the ongoing operation of the firm; second are those that can be
considered investments on which there will be returns in the future.
Money spent on new equipment or on research and development all
fall in the second category.
Firm-specific capital investments (broadly defined, including
human capital) increase the value of the firm if it remains as a going
concern. In terms of our model, it increases m, the rate at which the
earnings will grow. But such investments, at least over the short
term, reduce L—the value of the assets if liquidated. A firm-specific
investment, by its nature, has value only if the firm continues as a
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going concern. These investments also affect the value of s. The ef-
fect on s, however, is ambiguous. Some investments may, for exam-
ple, improve the reliability of the firm’s equipment and ensure that
the firm can maintain a high level of output. Other investments,
however, may have a high component of risk associated with them.
These are perhaps the most interesing ones.
A firm must retool its factory to remain competitive. The choice
might be between something conventional and something that uses
new technology. The safer alternative preserves the value of L. The
new technology requires custom machines that are harder to liqui-
date than more generic ones. While there are greater returns to the
firm that uses the new technology, there is also greater uncertainty
about these returns. In other words, new technology increases both m
and s.
The more L decreases, other things equal, the earlier one should
exercise the liquidation option. But the same riskiness that leads to a
lower liquidation value also should lead to greater benefits from
keeping the firm intact as a going concern. Much turns on the rela-
tionship between the time at which firm-specific investments need to
be made and the speed that we learn whether they will pay off. The
liquidation option is most likely to be valuable where the initial firm-
specific investments are small and where s declines quickly. Wait-
ing is least attractive when the investments come early and informa-
tion about their efficacy comes later.
VII. THE LIQUIDATION DECISION IN CHAPTER 11
In this part, we draw on our model to assess how well Chapter
11 makes the liquidation decision. There is no specific provision of
the Bankruptcy Code that deals with liquidation as we are using the
term. Rather, there are a number of processes that, in the context of
the case, are tantamount to asking the judge to shut the firm down.
For example, granting a motion to convert a Chapter 11 case to
Chapter 7 case typically has the effect of shutting the firm down.31
                                                  
31 See 11 U.S.C. §1112.
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Similarly, a judge that grants a secured creditor’s motion to seize its
collateral knows that her decision will close the door of the firm for-
ever.32 Denying the debtor the ability to use cash collateral or to ob-
tain debtor-in-possession financing may have the same effect.33
We can assess how much sense it makes to entrust the bank-
ruptcy judge with the liquidation decision by comparing her position
with that of the d cisionmaker we see emerge when the matter is left
to private contracting. In high technology industries, the venture
capitalist controls the liquidation decision when the firm is in eco-
nomic distress. The Chapter 11 mechanism is similar in that it too
puts the liquidation decision the hands of a single individual. We
need to ask, however, whether the substantial differences between
venture capitalists and bankruptcy judges are ones that matter for
purposes of making the liquidation decision.
Bankruptcy judges are not subject to market discipline. Venture
capitalists have their own money on the line.34 Not only does their
own financial stake make them intensely interested in making good
decisions, but there is a natural sorting mechanism as well. The
venture capitalists who make good liquidation decisions succeed.
Those who cannot run out of money and cease to be venture capital-
ists. There is no similar competitive process or sorting mechanism
for bankruptcy judges who make these decisions badly. They are
subject to reappointment every 14 years, but making the liquidation
decision is a small part of their docket and the people who make the
reappointment decision (other federal judges) are not themselves
well-positioned to assess the bankruptcy judge’s performance.
                                                  
32 See 11 U.S.C. §362(d)
33 See 11 U.S.C. §364.
34 Those who contribute to venture capital funds usually insist that the per-
son actually making the decisions have her own capital invested in the fund
as well. This investment ordinarily represents 10% of the entire fund and a
much larger percentage of the venture capitalists net worth.
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Another force at work may magnify this effect. The debtor’s
lawyers have flexibility to shop for different venues.35 Their natural
bias may be towards jurisdictions in which the judge is most likely
to award them generous fees. Fees are higher the longer the bank-
ruptcy runs. Hence, the liquidation decision may be entrusted to
those bankruptcy judges who are most reluctan to make it.36
Venture capitalists tend to specialize in particular industries and
spend much of their time picking and choosing among different i-
vestment opportunities. The venture capitalist then closely monitors
the firm during the entire period of its investment. By contrast, the
bankruptcy judge is a generalist. The overwhelming majority of her
cases (and much of her time) is spent with consumer debtors. Of the
few Chapter 11 cases on her docket, only a handful will involve on-
going businesses in which a nontrivial liquidation decision must be
made. The lack of experience may magnify the cognitive bias one
often sees in decisionmaking of this kind, the familiar problem of
escalating commitment.37 This cognitive bias may lead bankruptcy
judges to make liquidation decisions too late.
Successful venture capitalists are sophisticated investors. Bank-
ruptcy judges are lawyers by training. Most will have never run a
business or made payroll or brought a new product to market. They
typically have no training even in the fundamentals of corporate fi-
                                                  
35 Eisenberg and LoPucki find that “forum shopping” takes place in half of
the large Chapter 11 cases. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki,
Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 895 (1999). This study is
incomplete, however, because it is unable to show whether the observed
“forum shopping” reflects rent-seeking by lawyers or instead reflects the
debtor’s search for judges with greatest expertise.
36 See Robert Rasmussen & Randal S. Thomas, Timing Matters: An Eco-
nomic Explanation of Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations (manu-
script, Vanderbilt University May 1999).
37 See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in Big Muddy: A Study of Escalat-
ing Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 Org. Behav. & Hum.
Perf. 22-44 (1976).
31 OPTIMAL TIMING OF THE LIQUIDATION DECISION
nance. One can become a bankruptcy judge without knowing the
first thing about discounting to present value, marginal and average
costs, and sunk costs.
In addition, the venture capitalist will have detailed expertise
about the firm long before it encounters financial distress. At the
start of the case, the bankruptcy judge will know nothing about the
firm itself. In the rare case in which the bankruptcy judge is familiar
with a firm or the people who run it, she might be forced to recuse
herself because of the appearance of a conflict of interest.
Finally, once the Chapter 11 case starts, the judge must stand at
a distance. Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code forbids the bank-
ruptcy judge from attending the meetings at which the managers of
the firm must turn over information to the creditors. Rules of judicial
conduct limit the ability of the bankruptcy judge to gather informa-
tion informally. She probably cannot even talk with any of the play-
ers outside the presence of the others.
For all these reasons, one might well conclude that the bank-
ruptcy judge is ill-equipped to make the liquidation decision and that
therefore one should focus upon recapitalization processes, such as
expeditious sales of the entire firm to third parties, that take as little
time as possible.
We need to be careful here, however. The trajectory of bank-
ruptcy reform over the last 15 years has been emphatically in the di-
rection of a shorter process and the use of market mechanisms. But
shortening the process is itself costly. One does not, for example,
want to incur the costs of orchestrating a going-concern sale if the
firm will be liquidated before the sale can be consummated. More to
the point, reorganization regimes will always take some amount of
time. It is hard in such an environment to create a mechanism in
which the person who makes the liquidation decision has a financial
stake in making the decision well. One might require the bankruptcy
judge to accept bids from investment bankers and others to oversee
the sale and make the liquidation decision if necessary. This process
itself, however, will take time. More to the point, it may be no easier
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for the bankruptcy judge to make this decision well than to make the
liquidation decision.
Many of the other benefits that the venture capitalist enjoys
relative to the bankruptcy judge may exist with respect to other pos-
sible decisionmakers as well. The judge does not have the venture
capitalist’s experience with the firm, but anyone else brought on to
the scene would not have it either. Unlike ordinary judges, the bank-
ruptcy judge can bring in experts to evaluate the firm.38 In this re-
spect, she is no worse off than an investment banker. Moreover, she
can compel those who work for the firm to turn over information and
testify under oath. Moreover, the natural bias of the equityholders in
favor of reorganization and that of the creditors in favor of liquida-
tion induces each to turn over information to the bankruptcy judge.
As we have already noted, the contracts that venture capitalists write
assume that judges can acquire firm-specific information.
The liquidation decision may be the one where the differences
between the venture capitalist and the judge matter r latively little.
Venture capitalists play many roles in addition to that of the person
who makes the liquidation decision. Most important perhaps, she
must decide whether to inject new capital into the firm. The liquida-
tion decision itself requires only an up-or-down decision. The dec-
sionmaker needs to be able to answer three questions:
1. What are the prospects of this firm relative to others in
the industry?
2. How unpredictable are the prospects of firms in this
industry?
3. How much will we receive if we shut the firm down
and how will this change?
The questions here are simply another way of asking about the
values of µ, s, and L respectively. The bankruptcy judge may be
well equipped to answer these questions even if she would not be
                                                  
38 She can do this by having an examiner appointed.
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adept at making operating decisions. Indeed, it may be much more
important to have an intelligent person who is able to be decisive
than it be to have someone who poses particular expertise. The
common virtue for any judge lies in being able to make decisions
and live with them. It may be far better to have a judge make the liq-
uidation decision than an economist, a law professor, or a mid-level
corporate executive. For the liquidation decision, what matters most
is that someone has the power to gather information and is sur-
rounded by people who have every incentive to convey it in an ac-
cessible way. After this point is reached, the challenge may not lie in
the flow of information or the ability to process it, but rather in hav-
ing a decisionmaker who possesses the confidence, the willingness,
and the ability to act de isively.
There is another way of putting the point. If asked to evaluate
trial judges, lawyers most often distinguish among them by their
ability to listen and make decisions when the time comes. Bad
judges don’t listen to the evidence, they cannot bring things to clo-
sure, and, when they do, they act indecisively and inconsistently.
Bankruptcy judges who are otherwise good judges have the virtues
needed to make the liquidation decision well. The ability of Chapter
11 to make the liquidation decision well may turn on how able the
bankruptcy judges are as a general matter. If judges are well chosen
for other purposes, they will be adept at making the liquidation dec-
sion, at least if they know what questions to ask.
Let us assume that we have created a reorganization process that
lasts the optimum amount of time and we want to know how to im-
prove the way in which liquidation decisions are made. Given the
nature of the liquidation decision, asking this question is likely to be
little different from asking how to make bankruptcy judges better.
To be sure, the inquiry here is one in which intuitions about finance
may matter more than for a judge whose docket consisted of crimi-
nal law cases, but such intuitions are important for bankruptcy
judges as a general matter. One might prefer a legal system like
those in civil law countries in which judging is a discrete career path
and promotion turns on performance. Such a system may place a
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higher premium on an ability to take action when the time comes.
But the arguments here may track those that already exist in the
larger debates on this point.
There is, however, an important caveat to this claim that a reor-
ganization regime with well-chosen judges is likely to be one that
makes liquidation decisions well. The bankruptcy judge’s role in a
reorganization is passive. The bankruptcy judge’s window on the
case is now largely limited to the discrete issues parties bring to her
in open court. By contrast, the venture capitalist decides when to
gather additional information and when to take the measure of the
firm. The venture capitalist can take the pulse of the firm as often as
she wants. The bankruptcy judge can do it only after a party requests
a decision and after other interested parties are notified and brought
into open court.
In a typical tort case, such procedures are unproblematic. Com-
mon law actions revolve around money damages. Tort law works
because it aligns incentives before the fact. By contrast, the liquid-
tion decision is a decision about how resources are used. Being able
to control the timing of the decision matters as much as being able to
make the correct decision when asked to do so. To make the liquid-
tion decision effectively, the bankruptcy judge must be able to de-
cide when the question comes before her. We return to the model in
the next part and show that this deficit matters the most in the cases
that we care the most about.
VIII. THE COSTS OF PASSIVE JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
When a firm must make firm-specific investments, what is clear
is the need for the decisionmaker to have a constant flow of infor-
mation. At every point in time, the decisionmaker must assess the
cost and benefits of exercising the liquidation option. This can hap-
pen only if the decisionmaker is well-informed. Judges frequently
make their liquidation decisions turn on the existence of a business
plan from the debtor. Similarly, proposed legislation provides that
the bankruptcy judge must dismiss the Chapter 11 case or convert it
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to Chapter 7 if the debtor fails to attend meetings or fails to provide
information.39 This practice and these rules can be seen as devices to
ensure that the judge possesses the information needed to make the
liquidation decision. The information matters not simply because it
tells the judge whether the debtor can implement a plan. It also tells
the judge whether it is worth waiting any longer to find out.
Under current law, however, the judge has the power to liqui-
date only when a discrete issue comes before her. A venture capital-
ist can decide when to make a further inquiry and ensure she is pre-
pared to make the liquidation decision whenever it makes sense. The
bankruptcy judge must wait for others to come to her. Their incen-
tives may lead them to miss the optimal moments. Even if someone
has the incentive to come at the optimal time, others can take actions
that have the effect of speeding up the process or slowing it down.
To return to our stylized example, current law puts the judge in the
situation we would be in if the firm continued to receive earnings in
each period, but the judge could make the liquidation decision only
in every other period. This part explores the effects of this constraint
on the liquidation option.
When a venture capitalist has a controlling interest in a firm, she
has the power to liquidate it at any time. By contrast, the bankruptcy
judge can decide to liquidate a firm only when there is a hearing.
Even if interested parties did not behave strategically in bringing the
question to the court, the bankruptcy judge stands in a position dif-
ferent from and inherently inferior to that of the venture capitalist.
The bankruptcy judge’s greatest handicap may not lie in how much
expertise she possesses or how much knowledge she possesses rela-
tive to the venture capitalist, but in her inability to assess the value of
the firm continuously.
Over the years, bankruptcy judges have mitigated this deficit by
calling status hearings on their own motion. Congress added explicit
statutory authority for this practice in 1994 when it added §105(d) to
                                                  
39 S. 625.
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the Bankruptcy Code. It also gives the bankruptcy judge the power
to set a date for the filing of a plan of reorganization. These provi-
sions, however, fall short of giving the bankruptcy judge the ability
to monitor the case as closely as the venture capitalist. Our model of
the liquidation decision suggests that this inability is costly. Indeed,
it is the most costly in those cases where it matters the most, those
where the variance in future earnings  is the highest and therefore
the liquidation option is worth the most.
It is a commonplace that many of the costs of bankruptcy arise
because of the dramatic change in the debtor’s condition between
one decision point and another. Intuition tells us that the potential
cost of waiting rises as we move from a setting where the decision-
maker controls the timing of the decisions to one in which the deci-
sionmaker can make the decision only when others present it to her.
Our model provides a rigorous way to unpack this intuition.
A. A Model of Passive Judicial Decisionmaking
The simple two-period model of the previous section was a
model in which the d cisionmaker could make a decision at every
relevant date (although we only allowed for two decision dates). To
explore the consequences of decisionmaking in which the decision-
maker lacks such control, we extend this model to three periods
(Appendix 2 contains a general model). Thus, consider the distribu-
tion of firm earnings in Figure 2.
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As before we are assuming that a firm files for Chapter 11 pro-
tection at t = 1, the liquidation value of the firm is constant L at
every date, and the discount rate is 10%. Now, however, there are
potentially three opportunities to make the liquidation decision—in
periods t = 1, t = 2, and t = 3. If the firm is not liquidated at t = 3, it
will continue as a going concern indefi itely.
Additionally, there is uncertainty over future earnings at both
dates t = 2 and t = 3. A t = 2, earnings will be high ph with probabil-
ity p and low pl with probability 1-p. At t = 3, the distribution of
earnings depends on the price in previous period. If earn ngs are high
at t = 2, earnings at t = 3 will be high phh with probability q and low
phl with probability 1-q. Similarly, if earnings are low at t = 2, we
expect earnings to rise to plh with probability q and fall to pll with
probability 1-q.
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If the judge could make decisions continuously, she would face
the distribution of earnings in Figure 2. We want to explore what
happens when the judge can make decisions not at every possible
time, but only at a scheduled hearing.40 We can incorporate this idea
into the model here by assuming that the judge can only make deci-
sions at dates t = 1 and t = 3. Unlike a venture capitalist, she cannot
make a decision at t = 2. A judge in this setting faces the distribution
of firm earnings in Figure 3.
Figure 3
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40 Under § 1109, every party in interest may raise and appear and be heard
on any issue in the case. Hence, we are assuming that the handicap that
bankruptcy judges suffer is not that one party can manipulate the time at
which a meeting is held, but rather that meetings must be scheduled before
a decision can be made and this in turn takes time.
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In this setting,41 the judge faces a “lock-in” effect. If she
chooses not to liquidate the firm at t = 1, she has locked herself and
all other parties into this decision for a discrete interval (i.e., until t =
3). We are capturing the idea that she cannot make a liquidation de-
cision again until the parties are gathered in court before her on an-
other issue. During this interval, events may occur—earnings may
fall and liquidation may be optimal—but the judge will be unable to
react.42
This lock-in effect reduces, but does not destroy, the value of
the liquidation option. Indeed, even in a setting of discrete decision-
making the judge must balance the value of waiting two periods
(from t = 1 to t = 3) for more information before liquidating the firm
against the immediate payoff from liquidation. The lock-in effect,
however, implies that a judge will be less patient—and more willing
to exercise the liquidation option at  = 1—than the venture capital-
ist. Moreover, even if the judge does wait until t = 3 to liquidate the
firm, liquidation may take place later than was socially optimal.
The lock-in effect implies that the longer the period between
decisions, the greater the social costs due to poorly timed (i.e., pre-
mature or delayed) liquidation of troubled firms. The value of the
liquidation option will be lower when the judge faces Figure 3 than
when she faces Figure 2. Most significantly, the greater the uncer-
tainty about the future profitability of the firm, the more dramatic
this effect. Discrete judicial decisionmaking is most costly (due to
                                                  
41 We inflate earnings received at t = 2 (ph or pl) at the rate 10% to reflect
accurately their expected value at t = 3.
42 Parties, of course, have the ability to make emergency motions and ob-
tain expedited review. Some forms of relief, such as a temporary restrain-
ing order, do not even require the presence of other parties. One might ob-
tain such relief if, for example, those running the company were about to
abscond with its assets. But ordinarily a sudden change in condition (such
as the debtor’s failure to renew its insurance policy) is needed to obtain
review outside the ordinary course. Our concern, however, is primarily is
with which information accretes gradually over time.
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poorly timed liquidation decisions) for firms with high variance s in
earnings. The liquidation decision matters the most for firms whose
earnings are the most uncertain. Yet it is precisely these firms that
are hurt the most by delay in judicial decisionmaking. And the
longer the delay between judicial decisions, the higher the cost of
premature or delayed liquidation.
As in our previous model, we make a number of simplifying as-
sumptions. The liquidation value of firm assets L is $100. Initial
earnings p1 are $10. Firm earnings at t = 2 are either $15 or $5 with
equal probability.43 If earnings were high at t = 2, earnings will be
$17.50 or $12.50 with equal probability at t = 3.44 And if earnings
were low at t = 2, we expect earnings of $7.50 or $2.50 at t = 3 with
equal probability.45
Consider first the value of the liquidation option when the deci-
sionmaker controls the timing of decisions, that is, when she is not a
passive decisionmaker. The value of the liquidation option at t = 1
will depend on the d cisionmaking process in all future periods.
Hence, it is easiest to start by looking at the decisionmaking process
at t = 3 and then reason backwards. If current earnings are phh =
$17.50, the discounted value of the future stream of earnings at t = 3
is $175. If earnings are phl = $12.50, the present value of future
earnings falls to $125. In both cases, the d cisionmaker will keep the
firm intact as a going concern, as both amounts exceed the liquida-
tion value of $100.
If earnings fall at t = 2, but then rise at t = 3, the present value of
future earnings (in this case, earnings of plh = $7.50) is $75. Finally,
if earnings are pll = $2.50 at t = 3 (that is, if earnings are low at both
times), future earnings are worth only $25. In either case, the deci-
sionmaker will liquidate the firm at t = 3, as both earning streams are
less than $100.
                                                  
43 We are assuming that ph = 1.5p1 = 15 and pl = .5p1 = 5.
44 We are assuming that phh = 1.75p1 = 17.5 and phl = 1.25p1 = 12.5.
45 We are assuming that plh = .75p1 = 7.5 and pll = .25p1 = 25.
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Now turn to the d cisionmaking process at t = 2. Assume first
that earnings are high at t = 2. If the firm is allowed to continue op-
erating, the worst that could happen would be for the earnings to
drop to $12.50 each period and remain there forever. The discounted
value of such an earnings stream is $125, while if the decis onmaker
liquidates, the payoff to creditors is only $100. Hence, if the earnings
are high at t = 2, we are better off keeping the firm intact, even if we
encounter the worst possible outcome at t = 3. Keeping the firm in-
tact is a strictly dominant strategy.
The opposite is the case when earnings are low at t = 2. The best
the firm can do is earn $7.50 at t = 3 and then $7.50 each period af-
terwards. Discounted to its value at t = 2, this income stream is
worth only $75. Even in the best case, we are always better off liqui-
dating the firm and receiving $100 if we have low earnings at t = 2.
Liquidation is a strictly dominant strategy.
With this characterization of the decisionmaking process at t =
2, we can consider the value of the liquidation option at t = 1. As be-
fore, we need to compare the liquidation value of $100 to the value
of waiting to make the liquidation decision next period. If earnings
are high at t = 2, we shall keep the firm intact. Hence, the expected
income stream from the firm if earnings prove high at t = 2, dis-
counted to its value at t = 1, is $150.46
If earnings turn out to be low at t = 2, we know we shall liqui-
date the firm. We shall receive low earnings of $5 at t = 2 and we
shall also receive the liquidation value of $100 at t = 2 as well. We
discount this total of $105 to its value of a little more than $95.45 at
t = 1. Our expected return from waiting until t = 2 before deciding
whether to liquidate the firm is therefore $122.73, the average be-
tween these equally likely outcomes ($150 and $95.45 respectively).
                                                  
46 We know that we shall never liquidate if earnings are high at t = 2.
Hence, we take the income stream of $15 a period (the average of recei-
ing with equal likelihood either $17.50 or $12.50 at t = 3) in every period
thereafter and we discount it to present value. This equals $150 at t = 1.
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The value of the liquidation option is the difference between this
amount and $100, or $22.73.
We now consider the case of passive decisionmaking – the deci-
sionmaker can decide to liquidate the firm at t = 1 or t = 3, but not at
t = 2. The decision process at t = 3 is the same as before. The deci-
sionmaker must make a once-and-for-all decision whether to liqui-
date the firm. We know that the decisionmaker, if given the chance,
will keep the firm intact if earnings are either $17.50 or $12.50.
Similarly, we know she will liquidate if earnings are $2.50 or $7.50.
As in the two-period model, we value the liquidation option at t
= 1 in this setting by comparing the immediate $100 payoff from
liquidation to the present value of the earnings of the firm if we wait
until t = 3 to make the liquidation decision. If earnings are high at t =
2, we know we shall keep the firm intact no matter what happens
between t = 2 and t = 3. We already know that this earnings stream is
worth $150.47 Because it is likely to happen half the time, we dis-
count it to $75. If instead earnings are low at t = 2, we need to take
into account the effect of liquidating at  = 3, which is optimal
whether earnings rise or fall between t = 2 and t = 3. If earnings are
high ($7.50), the payoff to creditors is: (a) $5.50, earnings at t = 2
adjusted to reflect their value at t = 3;48 (b) current period earnings
received at t = 3 (or $7.50); plus (c) the liquidation value (or $100).
When we discount this amount to its value at t = 1, and adjust to re-
flect the probability that it will happen only one time in four, we
have $23.35. Similarly, if earnings fall to $2.50, the discounted ex-
pected payoff is $22.40.
Summing these discounted payoffs, we obtain the value of
waiting to liquidate firm assets and find that it is $120.75. Subtract-
ing the liquidation value of $100, we discover the option value is
$20.75. Thus, there is a difference between the value of the liquida-
                                                  
47 Once again, we are simply taking a stream of payments starting at t = 2
with an expected value of $15 and continuing forever. Measuring at t = 1
and discounting by 10%, such a stream is worth $150.
48 This figure comes from 1.1 x 1.5p1 = 1.65p1 = $16.50, where p1 is 10.
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tion option if the d cisionmaker is always able to liquidate ($22.73)
and its value if she cannot ($20.75). The $2 difference reflects the
cost of liquidating the firm at the wrong time (in our case, the cost of
liquidating too late). The parties are clearly better off with an active
decisionmaker who has the ability to liquidate at t = 2 as well as at t
= 3. When the d cisionmaker is passive, however, the parties suffer.
Half the time, creditors receive the $100 liquidation value a period
later than they would otherwise.
B. The Effect of Increasing Variance in Earnings
We have already shown that the value of the liquidation option
increases as uncertainty over future earnings (i.e., the variance of
earnings) increases. When the decisionmaker can decide at every
relevant time, she possesses a liquidation option that allows her to
wait for more information about firm profitability without exposing
the firm to significant loss. But there is a new lesson here as well. If
a judge is unable to make the liquidation decision at the optimal
time, she is less able to take advantage of new information about
firm earnings.  Hence, the inability to control when decisions are
made matters the most where the variance in earnings and the value
of the liquidation option are highest.
We have already explored the effect of uncertainty on the liqui-
dation option by increasing the “spread” of future earnings (i.e., the
range of possible values) while holding constant the expected (mean)
level of future earnings. We now do the same when the bankruptcy
judge cannot control when decisions are made as well as the venture
capitalist. Thus, assume now that distribution of firm earnings is
given by Figure 4.
While the spread in future earnings is greater, the expected
value of earnings at t = 1 if the firm remains intact as a going con-
cern is unchanged. Thus, while we have increased the variance (s)
of earnings, we have held constant the expected growth rate (m).
Here we expect nominal earnings of $10 in each period where p1 =
10, but greater variance.
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Our goal here is to examine the effect of uncertainty on the
value of the liquidation option when the d cisionmaker has the abil-
ity to liquidate at t = 2 and when she does not. We compute the o-
tion value in this setting of high uncertainty in precisely the same
way we computed it in the setting of low uncertainty. We first iden-
tify the decisionmaker’s optimal decision at t = 3 and then work our
way back to t = 2. Finally, we can turn to the decision at  = 1 and
compute the value of the liquidation option.
Figure 4
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Because of the higher variance, the worst outcome if earnings at
t = 2 are high is now $15, instead of $12.50. Similarly, the best out-
come if earnings at t = 2 are low is $5 instead of $7.50. In the first
example, the bankruptcy judge always kept the firm intact at t = 3 if
earnings were high at t = 2 and always liquidated if earnings were
low at = 2. The same applies here even more strongly.
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We can now turn to the liquidation decision at t = 2. If earnings
are low in this period, the decisionmaker will liquidate the firm be-
cause again nothing is to be gained by waiting. The best outcome is a
stream of earnings of $5 in every period. The present value of such a
stream discounted at 10% is $50. We are better off if the firm is liq-
uidated immediately for $100. By contrast, if earnings are high at t =
2, the decisionmaker will continue the firm because she knows that
liquidation will never be optimal at t = 3, where the worst outcome is
a stream of $15 each period, which has a present value of $150.
Now we may turn to the decisionmaker’s problem at t = 1 and
compute the value of the liquidation option at that date. The deci-
sionmaker must choose either to liquidate at t = 1 or preserve the
firm until the next decisionmaking date. As always, liquidation
yields $100. If the firm is preserved, there are two outcomes next
period. Earnings may rise and the payoff is a stream of payments of
$20 or $15 with equal probability (or $17.50 per period in expected
value). Discounting to its value at t = 1, this stream is worth $175.
However, it is equally likely earnings will be low at t = 2 nd we
shall liquidate the firm. In that event, we shall receive earnings of
$2.50 and $100 from liquidating the assets at t = 2. The expected
value of these payments at t = 1 is $93.18.
Given these outcomes are equally likely, the expected value of
the firm if we wait until t = 2 is the average of $175 and $93.10 or
$134.09. As before, the value of the liquidation option is this amount
less $100 or about $34. As in our two-period model, increasing the
variance increases the value of the liquidation option, in this case
from almost $23 to a little more than $34.
Consider now the value of the liquidation option when the deci-
sionmaker can make decisions only at t = 1 and t = 3. We already
know that if earnings at t = 2 are high, we shall keep the firm intact
at t = 3 and that the expected value of the income stream, measured
at t = 1, is worth $175. We also know that the decisionmaker will
liquidate at t = 3 if earnings were low at t = 2. The process for valu-
ing the firm in this event is familiar. We confront two possibilities.
The firm’s fortunes might improve between t = 2 and t = 3. In this
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event, the payoff to creditors at t = 3 is: (a) $2.75, earnings at t = 2
($2.50) adjusted to reflect their value at t = 3;49 (b) current period
earnings ($5); and  (c) the liquidation value $100. When we discount
this amount to its value at t = 1, we have $89.05. Similarly, if earn-
ings fall between t = 2 and t = 3, we have the same type of calcula-
tion, except that there are no earnings at t = 3. When we discount
this amount to its value at t = 1, we have $84.92.
To measure the value of waiting until t = 3 to make a decision,
we sum an even chance of receiving an income stream worth $175, a
25% chance of receiving an income stream of $89, and a 25%
chance of receiving one worth $84. This expected income stream is
worth a little less than $131. The value of the liquidation option is
therefore about $31.
As before, the greater uncertainty improves the value of the liq-
uidation option. Even when the judge can decide only at t = 3, the
higher uncertainty increases the value of the option from little less
than $21 to a little less than $31. More interesting for us, however, is
the importance of controlling the timing of the decision when the
variance of the earnings increases. As we have seen, these are the
cases where the liquidation option is worth the most.
When variance was low, the liquidation option was worth about
$23 when decisions could be made continuously and about $21
when they could not be. The cost of discrete decisionmaking was $2.
As variance increased, the loss from discrete ecisionmaking in-
creased as well. The liquidation option was worth only $31 instead
of $34. The difference of $3 is greater than when the variance was
lower. The $1 difference, of course, is an artifact of our model, but
the result itself is a general one. The more uncertainty in the ear-
ings, the more harm done when the ability to liquidate the firm
comes and goes.
We are worse off in a world in which the bankruptcy judge can-
not control the timing the liquidation decision as well as the venture
capitalist. Moreover, the ability to make decisions continuously
                                                  
49 This figure comes from 1.1 x.25p1 = .275p1 = $2.75, where p1 is 10.
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matters the most in the cases in which s is highest. The greater the
variance, the more important the liquidation option. But the greater
the variance, the more important the ability to exercise the option at
the optimum time. Separating the judge from active involvement in
the case compromises the judge’s ability to do this.
There is another effect worth noting. We have assumed that the
decisionmaker is equally well-informed when she can make deci-
sions only at given intervals. In terms of our model, we have as-
sumed that the variance in earnings, s, remains the same when the
decisionmaker can make decisions at t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3 and when
she can make decisions only at t = 1 and t = 3. Recall, however, that
one of the components of s was the decisionmaker’s lack of infor-
mation about the firm and its assets. If the decisionmaker has the
ability to monitor as she chooses, the information flowing to her may
be more steady and more reliable. If she returns to the case only
when there is a new hearing and a new issue to be resolved, she may
not know as much. This implies that will tend to decline more
slowly over time when the judge lacks the ability to control the proc-
ess actively. The less the judge can control the process, the more
slowly will s decline over time. Relative to the alternative world, we
have to wait longer before we know enough to liquidate.
Under current law, judges cannot actively monitor the firm.
Such a regime has two bad effects. First, the judge is less well-
informed. Second, she is less able to take advantage of what she does
know. Both these costs reinforce each other and both these costs
matter the most in the cases in which making the optimal liquidation
decision is most important.
Thus, we should reevaluate the paradigm that has insulated the
bankruptcy judge from active case management and rules that tend
to separate the bankruptcy process into a series of discrete decisions.
Reducing the number of chances to make a decision unambiguously
makes the costs of liquidating at something other than the optimal
CHICAGO  WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 48
time. Exercising the liquidation option at the optimal time ensures
that resources are put to their highest valued use.50
IX. CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS
Formal models of bankruptcy have relied on two ideas for many
years. First, they begin with the observation that no one in the proc-
ess is likely to make decisions well. All the players either have built-
in biases or lack the information needed to make necessary deci-
sions. What we know about venture capitalists and about ownership
structures elsewhere, however, suggests that nonverifiable informa-
tion may be a much smaller problem than these models assume. Sec-
ond, these models rest on the belief that market mechanisms can re-
place much of the bankruptcy decisionmaking about the optimal use
of assets. This belief, however, needs to be reexamined. Preparing
assets for sale takes time and during the interim someone has to de-
cide how these assets are to be deployed. Market mechanisms cannot
eliminate the need to make decisions about how the assets are to be
deployed.
In bankruptcy, as elsewhere, we need to spend resources gath-
ering information, and we need to know when we have reached the
point where we should stop. In bankruptcy, the most important
question revolves around the question of whether we keep the firm
intact as a going concern and answering this question depends cru-
cially on gathering the right amount of informatio  f the right kind.
Every legal system depends upon judges and others to make
good decisions at the right time. This aspect of the legal system is
largely unexplored. Similarly, every legal system affects both how
and when people make decisions. We now possess the tools to ex-
                                                  
50 Our model reenforces Triantis’s observations about the way in which
Canadian bankruptcy law empowers bankruptcy judges to “screen” firms
while they are being reorganized. See George G. Triantis, The Interplay
Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of
Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 I ternat’l Rev. L. & Econ. 101
(1996).
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plore these problems rigorously. The analysis we provide in this pa-
per can be naturally extended. For example, a judge’s ability to grant
a motion for summary judgment at any point during a trial represents
another form of real option. Particularly in cases where the dispute
involves the allocation of a property right (which may be more valu-
able in one party’s hands than another), the judge can either grant the
motion or wait for additional argument that her decide how to allo-
cate the property right. Indeed, by viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, she effectively biases the
information before her and adds greater variance to the possible out-
comes from trial. This increase in variance, as we have seen, raises
the value of the option to wait for more information.
Real options are also implicit in the judge’s decision whether to
grant a prisoner’s request for parole or a request for relief contained
in a habeas corpus petition. In both cases the judge can either grant
the request or wait for additional information about the prisoner’s
readiness to leave prison or about the conditions within the prison.
Similarly, a judge exercises a real option when she chooses to certify
a class action lawsuit. Although her choices are constrained by stat-
ute in many cases, the judge frequently has some freedom to deny
certification until additional information (about the harm suffered by
class members) becomes available.
Some of the most striking examples of real options come from
the regulatory state. As Dixit and Pindyck suggest in their analysis
of the Clean Air Act Amendments,51 regulatory agencies must al-
ways balance the social payoff from regulating today against the
value of deferring regulation until the agencies have more informa-
tion about potential harm. This calculus involves the valuation of a
real option. Similarly, the SEC exercises a real option whenever it
issues a No-Action letter stating that the Commission will not take
action against a particular individual or firm engaging in particular
                                                  
51 See DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4, at 405-18.
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conduct. Instead of waiting for additional information about the na-
ture of the conduct, the Commission commits itself not to regulate.
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APPENDIX 1
A Simple Model of Judicial Decisionmaking
Consider a firm that has filed for Chapter 11. Under the reor-
ganization plan, the firm is expected to generate profit pt each pe-
riod; however, this profit is uncertain and may vary considerably.
The real options literature offers a convenient and intuitive way to
model the flow of profits each period:
tttt dWdtd spmpp += (A1)
This equation52 implies that the change in profit at any instant in
time (dpt) will depend on the growth rate of firm profits (m) and the
variance in possible outcomes each period (sdWt). Here tW is a Wie-
ner process with mean 0][ =tdWE and variance dtdWE t =][
2 ,
which merely implies that the variance of firm profits is a form of
random walk.53 Notice that the level of profits at time t (pt) will
magnify the effect of m and s on the growth rate of profit.
At any date, the firm’s assets can be liquidated for a price L.54
Thus, at decisionmaking date t, the court must decide whether to al-
low the firm to continue operating or to order liquidation of the as-
sets. Due to bankruptcy procedure and time scarcity, the court can
only render a decision every k periods. Thus, if it orders liquidation,
the one-time payoff to creditors is L. However, if the court allows
the firm continue operations, the creditors will receive a certain pay-
                                                  
52 This representation is known as geometric Brownian motion with drift,
where the changes in the level of profits are l gnormally distributed.
53 DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4, at 59-132, discuss the properties of
Brownian motion.
54 To be more precise, if the firm’s assets are liquidated, creditors will re-
ceive an asset (a perpetuity) that pays l every period indefinitely. Given the
creditors’ discount rate r, the present value of this asset is 
r
l
L = .
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off ptdt today55 and uncertain payoffs pt+idt each period until the
next decisionmaking date k p riods later. This is a recursive problem
that can be modeled using dynamic programming tools.56 Assuming
that creditors discount future cash flows at rate r, the court must
solve the following problem (a Bellman equation57) at each deci-
sionmaking date:
{ })]([),(,max)( kttrkt VEekttLV +-++= ppp (A2)
where pt is governed by the definition in equation (1). Here V(pt )
represents the value of the court’s decision at time t, ),( kt +p
measures the expected present value of the uncertain stream of (net)
profits between the current decisionmaking date t and the next date
t+k, and Et is the expectation operator, which conditions only on in-
formation at time t. For simplicity, we will first consider a setting
where the court can make liquidation/continuation decisions con-
tinuously, i.e., k = dt. Problem (1) then bcomes
[ ]{ })(,max)( dtttrdttt VEedtLV +-+= ppp (A3)
subject to equation (1).
Intuitively, we expect the solution to the court’s problem (3) to
be a critical level of profit p* at which the optimal court decision is
                                                  
55 We multiply the rate of profit pt by the length of the period dt t  obtain
the level of profits that the firm generates during the period.
56 This problem is also known as an “optimal stopping” problem. A good
general framework for analyzing these types problems appears in DIMITRI
P. BERTSEKAS, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING AND STOCHASTIC CONTROL 95-
12 (Academic 1976). See also DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4, chapters 4
and 5.
57 A good discussion of the properties of B llman equations appears in,
DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4, at 59-132.
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to liquidate the firm assets.58 When expected profit pt dips below this
threshold value, it is best to liquidate the firm and divide the payoff
L among the creditors according to their relative priorities. As long
as profit exceeds p*, however, the court should allow the firm to
continue operations until the next decisionmaking event, k periods
later.59 This suggests that we can characterize the payoff to creditors
V(pt) as two regions: a “stopping region” and a “continuation re-
gion.” In the stopping region, profits are below the critical level, pt <
p*, it is optimal to liquidate the firm, and the payoff to creditors is L.
In the continuation region, on the other hand, profits exceed the
critical level, pt > p*, the court should permit the firm to continue as
a going concern, and the payoff is stochastic [ ])( dtttrdtt VEedt +-+ pp .
At the threshold value p*, creditors should be indifferent between
liquidating the firm and allowing it to continue (at least for short
while). At this point, therefore, the payoffs from stopping and con-
tinuing should be the same: [ ])( dtttrdtt VEedtL +-+= pp . If we can
characterize the value function )( tV p , we can use this indifference
condition to solve for the threshold profit level p*.
Before we can characterize )( tV p , we need to know the infor-
mation available to the court in making its decision. Although these
profits are uncertain, information in the reorganization plan should
give the court a good sense of the probable growth rate of firm profit
(m) and the variance in possible outcomes each period (s). Thus, the
court will know the process determining firm profits, as defined in
                                                  
58 We are assuming that the creditors’ discount rate r exceeds the growth
rate of profit m because the solution would be trivial otherwise: the court
would never liquidate the firm since the growth rate of firm profits exceeds
the growth rate on any other investment available to the creditors.
59 We need to impose more structure on the profit process (1) and the value
function V(pt ) to ensure that the critical level p* exists and is unique. The
necessary assumptions are standard in the economics literature and are de-
scribed in DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 4, at 128-30.
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equation (1). Thus, we can characterize )( tV p  by substituting the
process (1) into the court’s problem (3). Substituting (1) into (3)60
and applying Ito’s Lemma,61 we obtain a differential equation de-
scribing the profit process:
0)()(''
2
1
)(' 22 =-++ tttttt rVVV pppspmpp (A4)
If we assume that equation (A4) describes all profits pt > * and
that V(pt) is a continuous function when profit is positive, we can
solve this equation using the standard tools for second-order, non-
homogeneous differential equations.62 We obtain the following solu-
tion:63
m
p
pp b
-
+=
r
AV ttt)(
                                                  
60 Substitution yields )]([)()1( tt
rdt
tt
rdt dVEedtVe ppp -- +=- , where
)()()( tdttt VVdV ppp -= + . Note that if r is small (which we will assume
is the case), we can use the approximation rdte rdt -=- 1 .
61 Ito’s Lemma states that
tttttttt dWVdtVdtVdV sppsppmppp )('))((''2
1
)(')( 2 ++= .
Substituting this into the equation in the previous footnote, omitting terms
that converge to zero faster than the increment dt as 0®dt , and simpli-
fying, we obtain equation (4) in the text.
62 See ALPHA CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS IN MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS 502-11, 541-43 (McGraw-Hill 1984) for details.
63 We are using the property ¥<÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
¥® p
p
p
)(
lim
V
.
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where A is a constant (which we will determine below) and b is a
function of m and s and is always less than zero.64 We need to add
more structure to this problem to solve for A. The standard assump-
tion is “smooth pasting.” First, the payoff from liquidation must
equal the payoff from continuation at the threshold level of profits:
[ ])(* dtttrdt VEedtL +-+= pp . Second, at the threshold profit level, the
derivative of the payoff from liquidation (L) with respect to profit
must be equal to the derivative of the payoff from continuation with
respect to profit. That is, V’(pt) = 0 when this derivative is evaluated
at p*. Imposing the second smooth pasting condition, we can show
that 
( )
)(
1*
mb
p
b
-
-
=
-
r
A c  and ( ) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
=
-b
b
p
b
pp
m
p
1*1)( c
t
tt r
V . Imposing
the second condition, we finally obtain the threshold level of profit:
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-=
1
)(*
b
b
mp rLc (A5)
where the subscript c indicates that this is a solution for the c nti-
nous decisionmaking setting.
There are several important features of the optimal liquidation
point (A5). First, a judge should not liquidate the firm even if ex-
pected value of future earnings (discounted to present value) is less
than the liquidation value of firm assets. In other words, even if the
“net present value” of the firm is negative, a judge should still wait
to liquidate at a future date. As traditionally defined, the net present
value (NPV) of an investment is the difference between the present
                                                  
64 Since b must satisfy the quadratic expression
0)1(
2
1
)( 2 =-+-= rQ mbbbsb , the negative root of the expression is
2
2
22
2
2
1
2
1
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m
s
m
b
r
+úû
ù
êë
é ---= .
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value of the (expected) return on an investment and the cost of that
investment. In the context of bankruptcy decisionmaking, NPV is the
difference between the present value of (expected) firm profits and
the liquidation value of firm assets:
LdseENPV st
str
tt -= ò
¥
+
+-
0
)( ][ p
A traditional NPV approach would lead the court to liquidate
whenever NPV<0. This approach, however, would be erroneous. To
see this, consider the NPV of the firm at the optimal liquidation
point: when pt is equal to p*. Using equation (A5),65 the NPV equa-
tion becomes:
                                                  
65 Notice that [ ] tzztt eE pp m=+ . This follows from the following proof.
Given the law of motion tttt dWdtd spmpp += , we can create the trans-
formation tt ddy pln= . Using Ito’s Lemma
( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ += )(''
2
1
)(')( 2 xfxdxxfxdf s , we have
( ) ( ) t
t
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Notice that this is a very simple expression independent of pt. We are ulti-
mately interested in Et[pt+z]. Since we now have an expression for the
change in yt = lnpt over time, we can determine the total change in lnpt
between dates  and t+z:
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Applying the exponential function to both sides, we have
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Since b<0, we know 0
1
1 <
-b
. Therefore, NPVt<0 at the threshold
level of profits. That is, at the optimal liquidation point the NPV is
negative: the court should not liquidate until the net present value of
the firm has fallen sufficiently below the liquidation value of the
firm assets. At the optimal liquidation point, the wedge between the
(negatively valued) NPV and zero reflects the op ion value of being
able to defer liquidation until the court gathers additional informa-
tion. Until the NPV dips sufficiently below zero, the court may wait
to liquidate because there is a positive probability that firm profit
will rise in the future. Liquidation is optimal only when the opportu-
nity cost of allowing the firm to continue operation (measured by the
negative value of the NPV offsets the value of being able to wait.
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Finally, when we compute the expectation of pt+z, conditioning on infor-
mation available at t, we obtain the desired result:
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This follows from the fact that ( )tzt WW -+  is a normally distributed ran-
dom variable with mean zero and variance z. The xpected value of the
exponential of such a random variable is ( )[ ] 22)1( ss eeE iztizt WWt =+-+-+ - . Thus
( )[ ] 2
2s
s zWW
t eeE tzt =
-+ .
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A second important feature of (A5) is the effect of changes in
the growth rate (m) or variance (s) of earnings on the optimal time to
liquidate firm assets. We can show that p* decreases as either m or s
increases.66 Intuitively, this is sensible: the higher the growth rate m,
the higher the likelihood that profits will rise in the future. If the
NPV of the firm becomes negative due to a sudden shock, the higher
the growth rate the higher the probability that the firm will recover in
the future and the NPV will rise above zero. Thus, we expect courts
to be more patient, to be less willing to exercise the liquidation op-
tion, the higher the expected growth rate of profits. Similarly, the
higher the variance in profit s, the higher the likelihood that profit
will unexpectedly increase significantly in the future. Hence, there is
greater value in waiting as  increases.
The discussion in the main text suggests that we may write the
variance of profit as a function of time: ( )tss = . One natural as-
sumption is that 
( )
0<
dt
tds
, i.e., variance will fall over time as more
information is gathered. Incorporating these modifications into our
                                                  
66 Consider first the effect of changes in m on p*. From (5), we know
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tive will be negative if 0<
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. To show that this is the case, recall that b
must satisfy the quadratic equation 0)1(
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Totally differentiating this equation with respect to m, w  have
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earlier model, we can model the judicial decis onmaking process as
the solution to the following problem:
[ ]{ }dtttrdttt VEedtLV +-+= p,max
subject to the law of motion for profits ( ) tttt dWtdtd psmpp += .
The solution method for this problem is somewhat complex (requir-
ing numerical computation) and will not be pursued here. However,
it should be intuitively clear that the value of the liquidation option
will decrease with time. Recall that the value of the liquidation op-
tion increases with the variance of profit: the higher the variance, the
higher the probability that profits will increase tomorrow. Under the
assumption that 
( )
0<
dt
tds
, the variance of profit is decreasing;
hence the value of the liquidation option is decreasing. This implies
that the threshold profit rate p* should increase over time:
( )
0
*
>
dt
tdp
.
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APPENDIX 2
A Simple Model of Passive Judicial Decisionmaking
Here we reconsider the formal model of Appendix 1 in a setting
where the bankruptcy judge can make liquidation decisions only
when she is asked to do so (i.e., on the motion of a creditor). In other
words, the judge is a passive decisionmaker, reaching the liquidation
decision at discrete points.
Recall the general problem (A3) facing the judge:
{ })]([),(,max)( kttrkt VEekttLV +-++= ppp
where k measures the interval between decisions. In Section I we
considered a setting where the court could make decisions continu-
ously, so we let k = dt. Suppose now that the judge no longer pos-
sesses the option to make decisions continuously. Instead, she must
wait k = n periods between each decision. Thus, if the judge chooses
to liquidate the firm at date t, th payoff is L. But if she chooses to
keep the firm intact at t, she will be unable to reconsider this deci-
sion until date +n. During the intervening n periods, the firm will
accumulate an uncertain amount of profit ),( ntt +p . From the van-
tage point of the judge at date t, the expected value of this uncertain
stream of net profit is ò +-=+
n
zt
rz
t dzeEntt
0
),( pp , where pt follows
the usual law of motion, tttt dWdtd spmpp += . When the next de-
cisionmaking date arrives, at t+n, the value of the firm will depend
on the level of profits at that date, pt+n. Since these profits are un-
certain when the judge makes a decision at date t, the exp cted value
of the firm at the next d cisionmaking date will be [ ])( nttrn VE +- p .
Hence, the payoff in the continuation region will be the sum of the
expected profit stream until the next decisionmaking date plus the
expected value of the firm at that date:
[ ])(
0
ntt
rn
n
zt
rz
t VEedzeE +
-
+
- +ò pp . We can simplify this by noting that,
from the vantage point of the bankruptcy judge at date t,
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. That is, pt+z is a lognormal random vari-
able with mean zte
mp  and variance ( )122 -zzt ee smp . Hence, the pay-
off from permitting the firm to continue as a going concern is
( ) [ ])(1 )( nttrnnrt VEeer +
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Thus, the problem facing the bankruptcy judge in a setting of
passive decisionmaking is
( ) [ ]
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The solution to this problem is quite difficult and we do not attempt
it here.67 Instead, we will only characterize the solution graphically.
Our goal here is to illustrate informally the effect of n (the length of
time between judicial decisions) on the value of the firm )( tV p  and
the optimal time to exercise the liquidation option *dp .
Consider first two limiting cases: (1) n = 0 and (2) n = ¥. We
considered the first case in the continuous time model of Appendix
1, where we found ( ) ú
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V  in the con-
tinuation region, LV t =)(p when the court liquidates firm assets, and
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b
mp rLc  is the threshold profit rate at which liquida-
tion is optimal. We depict this characterization of judicial decision-
making in Figure A1.
                                                  
67 Bertsekas offers a general framework for solving this problem. See
BERTSEKAS, supra note 56, 95-102.
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Figure A1
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Now consider the other limiting case, n = ¥. Here the court is
effectively making a one-time liquidation decision; there is no liqui-
dation option. The court’s problem boils down to the standard NPV
calculation: liquidate the firm so long as the expected present value
of future profits is less than or equal to the liquidation value of the
assets. More formally, this problem is
( )
ïþ
ï
ý
ü
ïî
ï
í
ì
ú
û
ù
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é
= +
¥
-
¥ ò dzeELV ztrztt pp
0
,max
subject to the usual characterization of dpt in equation (A1). The
solution to this problem is LV =¥ )(p  for 
*
¥£ pp t  and
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
=¥ m
pp
r
V t
1
)(  for *¥³ pp t , where 
*
¥p  is the threshold rate of
profit at which liquidation is optimal. This threshold satisfies the
condition ( )mp -=¥ rL* , at which the NPV of the firm is zero. That
is, there is no liquidation option. Figure A2 depicts the value of the
firm under this legal regime.
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Figure A2
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Two important features of these two limiting cases deserve at-
tention. First, the threshold (or liquidation) rate of profit is higher in
the case where n = ¥ than where n = 0: ** cpp ³¥ . As stated, NPV of
the firm is zero at the threshold *¥p ; there is no liquidation option
when the court must wait an infinite number of periods to reconsider
the liquidation question. In (A6) of Appendix 1, we showed that the
NPV of the firm will be negative at the optimal time to liquidate the
firm when there is a positive liquidation option. Indeed, the greater
the option value of waiting, the lower the threshold *cp  and the more
negative the NPV of the firm at the threshold level of profits. The
difference between *cp  and 
*
¥p  reflects the value of the liquidation
option.
Second, the going concern value of the firm – the value when
profit exceeds the threshold rate (*cp  or 
*
¥p ) – is lower when n = ¥
than when n = 0. Formally, )()( pp ¥³ VVc  for all 
*
cpp ³ . Intuitively,
the value of the firm is higher when the court can make better liqui-
dation decisions. When n =0 and the court can continuously moni-
tor the firm, the court can choose the optimal time to liquidate. But
when it must wait n>0 periods between each decision date, the court
may make the liquidation decision late. During the waiting time
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between decisions, the value of the firm may fall below the critical
threshold but the court will be unable to act.
Figure A3 illustrates both of these features.
Figure A3
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This figure makes clear that the going concern value of the firm will
always suboptimal when n>0. Consider, for example, some finite
waiting time n>0. Figure A4 illustrates the value of the firm under
this legal regime.
Figure A4
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The going concern value of the firm )(pnV  will be lower than
the value in a world of continuous decisionmaking )(pcV  (but higher
than the value in a world with no options )(p¥V ): since the court has
potentially lost the option to make liquidation decisions at the opti-
mal time, the value of the firm is lower. Additionally, the threshold
rate of profit (when liquidation is optimal) will be higher than *cp
(but less than *¥p ).
Thus, the value of the firm is highest )(pcV  when the bank-
ruptcy judge is free to exercise the liquidation option at the optimal
moment. The value of the firm is lowest )(p¥V  when the judge can
never exercise this option. And the value is somewhere in between
these two extremes when the judge is a passive decisionmaker who
does possess a liquidation option, but may be unable to exercise it at
the optimal moment. During the n periods between decisionmaking
dates, the earnings of the firm may fall dramatically and liquidation
may be optimal, but the judge will be unable to act. As n increases, it
becomes more likely that the judge will be unable to exercise the
liquidation option at the right time.
All rights reserved.
Readers with comments should address them to:
Douglas G. Baird
Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
Douglas_Baird@law.uchicago.edu
Edward R. Morrison
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
ermorris@midway.uchicago.edu
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1. William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries
and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach (July
1991).
2. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort (August 1991).
3. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism
(September 1991).
4. Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of
Contract (February 1992).
5. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools (February 1992).
6. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation
of AIDS (April 1992).
7. Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April
1992).
8. William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An
Economic Analysis (July 1992).
9. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of
Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study (August 1992).
10. Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A
Theoretical Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy (September
1992).
11. Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts
(November 1992).
12. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life
(January 1993).
13. J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages:
Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan (March 1993).
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law
(April 1993).
15. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everyone Else Does) (April 1993).
16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital
(August 1993).
17. J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The
Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993).
18. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Anticipatory Adjudication (September 1993).
19. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law (September 1993).
20. Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis
(October 1993).
21. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle
(March 1994).
22. Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the
Law (June 1994).
23. William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis
(June 1994).
24. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from
Early Modern Japan (August 1994).
25. Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows
(August 1994).
26. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the
Intellectual Property Protection of Software (August 1994).
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994).
28. David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond
Cimino (December 1994).
29. Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational
Distribution of Lifetime Consumption (January 1995).
30. Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract
Damages (February 1995).
31. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller,
Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation
(March 1995).
32. Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the
American Business Enterprise (April 1995).
33. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995).
34. J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995).
35. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software
and Biotechnology (November 1995).
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January
1996).
37. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence
in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan (January 1996).
38. Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or
Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? (March 1996).
39. Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996).
40. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Legal Disputes Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other
Collectibles (July 1996).
41. John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and
Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns (August 1996).
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs (September 1996).
43. Douglas G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An
Overview of the la and Economics of Financially Distressed
Firms (March 1997).
44. Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March
1997).
45. William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An
Autobiographical Essay (March 1997).
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997).
47. John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral
Competitiveness: Evidence from California’s State Legislative
Races (May 1997).
48. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A
Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms (June 1997).
49. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large:
Contract Law through the Lens of Laissez-Faire (August 1997).
50. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law) (December 1997).
51. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E.
Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998).
52. John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign
Expenditures are Increasing: The Government is Getting
Bigger (February 1998).
53. Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction
to Economic Analysis of Law (March 1998).
54. Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and
Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens? (April 1998).
55. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics (May 1998).
56. John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?:
Affirmative Action, Police Departments, and Crime (May
1998).
57. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order
Decisions (June 1998).
58. Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages:
Their Determinants, Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of
Supreme Court and Congressional Attempts to Limit Awards
(July 1998).
59. Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (August
1998).
60. John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women’s Suffrage
Change the Size and Scope of Government? (September 1998)
61. Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of
Chapter 11 (October 1998)
62. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in
the Tax Law (November 1998)
63. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law (November 1998)
64. John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and
Totalitarianism (December 1998)
65. Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest:
Notes Toward A “Third Way” (January 1999)
66. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence (February 1999)
67. Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared
Information Goods (February 1999)
68. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic
Enterprise (February 1999)
69. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling
and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment
(March 1999)
70. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?
(March 1999)
71. Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine,
Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation
Costs (March 1999)
72. Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis (April 1999)
73. John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim
Public Shooting, Bombings, and Right-to-Carry Concealed
Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law
Enforcement (April 1999)
74. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study (May 1999)
75. Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It
Back Together Again (May 1999)
76. William M. Landes, Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic
Returns to the Ganz Collection (May 1999)
77. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do
People Want Optimal Deterrence? (June 1999)
78. Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run
Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological Change
(June 1999)
79. David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999)
80. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of
Radical Judicial Error (August 1999)
81. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman,
Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals? Deliberation,
Polarization, and Punitive Damages (September 1999)
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999)
83. Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations
Analysis, with Special Reference to Law and Economics
(September 1999)
84. Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at
Intel (October 1999)
85. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis
(October 1999)
86. Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing
and Legal Decisionmaking: The Case of the Liquidation
Decision in Bankruptcy (October 1999)
